Document: Minister for External
Affairs Percy Spender's message to Patrick Gordon-Walker, United Kingdom
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth affairs, 4 April
1951
Source [link within this page]:
CRS A5460, item 217/6, pt 2, National Archives
of Australia, Canberra.
Comments:
Even in the context of the Korean War and growing fear of
Asian communism, Spender emphasised the central importance of Australia’s
“profound distrust of Japan” as a motive for his efforts
to achieve a formal security pact with the United States.
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So far as Australia is concerned
we are delighted to learn that the United Kingdom Government accepts
the proposal for a Tripartite Pact in the Pacific along the lines discussed
in Canberra with Mr. Dulles. Such an arrangement including the United
States, Australia and New Zealand has always been and still is the first
objective of the Australian Government …
In order to understand clearly the Australian attitude
towards a Pacific Security Pact it is necessary I think to see it against
the following background. Australia still has a profound distrust of
Japan based upon its bitter experience during the last world war. While
we hope of course that Japan will change her ways and while we will
do what we can to assist in this process at the same time we apprehend
the distinct danger that Japan will follow in future an opportunist
line in accordance with her own self-interest. Our view as you are aware
has consistently [been] that restrictions upon Japanese armament should
be written into the Peace Treaty and that the Treaty should also establish
central machinery to enforce these restrictions. We appreciate naturally
the [difficulty] in securing effective control but our view has nonetheless
been that it did not follow that no control should be attempted. We
have opposed acceptance of any Peace Treaty which contains no prohibition
of United Kingdom on Japanese Re-armament. This would seem to us an
invitation to Japan when proper time comes to build up her armaments
to any degree she chooses. While this process may take some time it
would be greatly accelerated in the not unlikely event of Japan entering
into some temporary or longer term alliance with Communist China or
Russia. In our opinion one or both of these two latter counties might
well find it to its advantage to make substantial concessions to Japan
in order to win her over to the Communist side. We can think of no more
serious threat in the Pacific area than active collaboration between
Russia, China and Japan …
In the description which I have given above of background
to the Australian attitude I have not mentioned other dangers which
we see in the Far East for instance the obvious danger of aggressive
communist imperialism. In view of Korean incident this danger need scarcely
be elaborated. Nevertheless it is true to say that the very real danger
of a reassurance [sic] of Japanese militarism has been our special concern
in dealing with security arrangements in the Pacific. It is moreover
essential that Australian public opinion should be given effective assurance
on this subject. Otherwise a Japanese Peace Treaty which contained no
limitations whatever upon Japanese Rearmament [and] had no reference
to central machinery could have in Australia far-reaching consequences.