Document: US special envoy John
Foster Dulles to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, General Douglas
MacArthur, 2 March 1951
Source [link within this page]:
US Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1951, Volume 6, Part 1 (Washington, DC, US
Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 176-77.
Comments:
In this document Dulles emphasises the limited nature of
the treaty negotiated in Canberra. The new ANZUS Treaty would allow
the United States to “discharge its obligations by action against
the common enemy in any way and in any area that it sees fit.”
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TOP SECRET
WASHINGTON, March 2,
In Canberra I had a talk with the Prime Minister, a meeting with the
Cabinet, and numerous joint conferences over a period of four days with
Spender, the Minister far External Affairs, and Doidge, the Minister
for External Affairs of New Zealand. Our initial talks dealt entirely
with the question of a Pacific Island Security Pact since it was obvious
that the willingness of Australia and New Zealand to accept the United
States version of a Japanese Peace Treaty would be conditioned by the
degree to which the United States would formalize its security relations
to them.
Our initial discussions were devoted to the question of the member¬ship
of a possible Pacific Island Pact. Both Australia and New Zealand wanted
it limited to a tripartite arrangement between themselves and the United
States, while we urged the inclusion of the Philippines and the eventual
admission of Japan, at such time as the latter would he in a position
to qualify under the terms of the Vandenberg Senate Resolution which
requires "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid."
Australia's and New Zealand's attitude on membership was influenced
by their concern over public reactions to an "alliance" with
Japan at this time and by the United Kingdom's objection to the inclusion
of any Asiatic nation without the inclusion of others. The United Kingdom,
as you know, is unwilling to see a general Pacific Island Pact created
which does not include herself and yet, at the same time, does not want
to join an island pact for fear of the effect of such action on the
security and stability of her possessions on the Asia mainland. New
Zealand, in particular, is very sympathetic towards this British attitude
and is unlikely to take any action in opposition to it.
We finally agreed to draft a proposed treaty which would make no mention
of membership and which would be so worded as to permit the inclusion
of ally number of states as and when such action became desirable and
politically feasible. We made it clear that the United States might
find it necessary to insist on the Philippines as a charter member and
both Foreign Ministers indicated that, in their personal opinions, there
would probably be no serious objections to such action. As yet we have
no official indication as to British reaction to the inclusion of the
Philippines.
A copy of the Draft Security Treaty which we agreed to bring back to
Washington for consideration by the Government is enclosed with this
letter. Since it has had very limited distribution here and since there
has been no admission of its existence, I would appreciate it if you
would consider it as furnished you solely for your own information.
Certain features of it are discussed briefly below:
Preamble:
The second paragraph recognizes the United States' commitments in Japan,
the Ryukyus and the Philippines and is designed to tie this treaty in
with those areas in the event that Japan and the Philippines are not
initially members of the pact.
The third paragraph is a recognition of Australia's commitments in
Malaya and New Zealand's commitments in the Middle East.
Article II
This is a quotation from the Vandenberg Senate Resolution and is included
to facilitate ratification by the U.S. Senate.
Article IV
This is the meat of the treaty. The language is drawn from the Monroe
declaration. While it commits each party to take action, (presumably
go to war) it does not commit any nation to action in any particular
part of the world. In other words, the United States can discharge its
obligations by action against the common enemy in any way and in any
area that it sees fit.